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inDia – solaR cells anD mexico – 
taxes on soft DRinks: multilevel 
Rule of laW challenges in the 
inteRpRetation of aRt. xx (D) of 
gatt 1994 in Wto case laW
Henrik Andersen*
Abstract: Rule of law is developed by various institutions 
of government and judiciaries at the national, regional, and 
international level. The interface of rules of law between various 
systems poses problems as to how to uphold law as supreme 
when the various systems do not have a clear connecting factor 
to translate a rule of law with another. The article discusses the 
multilevel rule of law challenges in the application of Art. XX (d) 
of GATT 1994, which protects those measures which otherwise 
are inconsistent with the WTO trade rules, if they are necessary 
to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. Besides an 
identification of some overall rule of law challenges arising 
from when WTO Members apply Art. XX(d) of GATT 1994 to 
measures which seek to ensure compliance with domestic laws 
and regulations, the article has a particular focus on Mexico – 
Taxes on Soft Drinks and India – Solar Cells, which highlight the 
problems that arise when WTO members apply Art. XX (d) of 
GATT 1994 as justification for complying with their obligations 
under international law. There are in particular two issues of 
concern from a rule of law approach: the connection between 
international law and national law, like incorporation and direct 
effect, and the potential jurisdictional and norm overlap between 
WTO law and other international law. Some of the multilevel 
rule of law challenges identified in Mexico – Taxes on Soft 
Drinks seem to be overcome in India – Solar Cells, but there 
are still areas of uncertainty in the multilevel rule of law clashes 
between the WTO and other regimes which need to be addressed 
in future cases.
* Senior Lecturer at Lancashire Law School, University of Central Lancashire, UK.
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intRoDuction
In the recent India – Solar Cells case,1 the Appellate Body (AB) of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) handled an issue concerning the inter-
face between international law and national law in Art. XX (d) of GATT 
1994. Art. XX (d) is an exemption to the general free trade principles of the 
WTO. It applies if a national measure, which otherwise would be an obsta-
cle to trade, is necessary to ensure compliance with laws or regulations. 
One question that arises is whether international law can fall under laws or 
regulations, or whether it is only reserved for domestic laws and regulations. 
10 years before India – Solar Cells, the AB had dealt with a similar issue in 
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks,2 and provided some guidance on the rela-
tionship, which was further clarified in India – Solar Cells.
This article addresses the multilevel rule of law challenges in the interface 
between international and national law in the context of Art. XX (d) of 
GATT 1994. It is an area which is untouched in literature and which deserves 
closer analysis due to the increase in overlaps between various regimes on 
national, regional and international level. The overlaps pose challenges in 
respect of the function of rule of law as to provide predictability in law for 
various market participants. The article has a special focus on Mexico – 
Taxes on Soft Drinks and India – Solar Cells.
Rule of law is traditionally associated with national systems but has 
increasingly gained more space in international law.3 For example, for-
1 “India  – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/AB/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 14 October 2016.
2 “Mexico – Tax –Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages”, WT/DS308/AB/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 24 March 2006.
3 See Simon Chesterman, “An International Rule of Law”, 56 Am. J. Comp. L., 331 (2008).
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mer members of the AB have addressed the role rule of law plays in, and is 
developed and promoted in, WTO panel and AB jurisprudence.4 Rule of law 
in the context of Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 must be seen as a multilevel 
concept due to the interface between various legal systems.
This article will claim that although in India – Solar Cells, the AB has 
attempted to overcome some of the rule of law problems which arose from 
its previous ruling in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, new problems have 
arisen. The article will first provide an overview of rule of law and discuss 
conceptual and normative challenges therein, and then place it in the context 
of international law to identify what the article means by multilevel rule of 
law challenges. Next, the article will discuss Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 
and provide an overview of panel and AB case law5 before focusing on the 
multilevel rule of law issues arising from Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks and 
India – Solar Cells.
Rule of laW as a multilevel concept: an oveRall 
context
The concept of Rule of Law
In its most abstract form, the rule of law means that law is supreme. This 
implies that governments, individuals, and corporations are bound by law in 
all their actions.6 This is in contrast to political systems where law will not 
apply on the ruling power, like a rule of man system.7 From a market per-
spective, the purpose of rule of law is to provide predictability for the mar-
ket agents. They can make informed decisions about their market conduct, 
strategic decisions, contractual arrangements etc. by knowing in advance 
4 See former Appellate Body Members James Bacchus and Jennifer Hillman; James Bacchus, 
“Groping Towards Grotius: The WTO and the International Rule of Law”, 44 Harv. 
Int’l L.J.533 (2003); Jennifer Hillman, Appellate Body Annual Report for 2011, WT/
AB/17 (13 June 2012). See also speech by former WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy at 
Bilkent University, Ankara, 15 March 2013, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/
sppl272_e.htm.
5 Note that when there is reference to GATT case law further in the article, the reference will 
not be to “GATT 1994,” but instead to “GATT 1947” although the provision of Art. XX 
(d) is the same.
6 Inspiration has been taken from Hayek, although he stresses the rule of law as binding on 
the government, whereas I extend the scope of agents to include corporations and individ-
uals. See Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 112 [Bruce Caldwell (ed.), 2007].
7 See about rule of man systems; Leigh K. Jenco, “‘Rule by Man’ and ‘Rule by Law’ in 
Early Republican China: Contributions to A Theoretical Debate”, 69 J. Asian Stud., 181, 
(2010).
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the potential legal barriers, unfair trading rules, rights of consumers, rights 
of other corporations, rights of public institutions and so on. By upholding 
law as the supreme norm of governance in a society, the constitutional and 
institutional structures must have certain elements that guarantee the func-
tion of the rule of law. It is highly debated in literature what the elements 
are.8 One of the main concerns is whether the rule of law is a higher-ranking 
norm which can evaluate law’s compliance with specific values, like human 
rights and democratic principles.
The formal version rejects the judgemental character of rule of law. For 
example, Raz is a proponent of a formal version of rule of law. According to 
him, the rule of law is value neutral and can be applied to all types of polit-
ical systems irrespective of the level of democracy, human rights etc. Raz 
suggests a non-exhaustive list of eight precepts of rule of law which can vary 
in degree. They are: 1) All laws should be prospective, open, and clear; 2) 
laws should be relatively stable; 3) the making of particular laws (particular 
legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules; 4) 
the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; 5) the principles of 
natural justice must be observed; 6) the courts should have review powers 
over the implementation of the other principles; 7) the courts should be eas-
ily accessible; and 8) the discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should 
not be allowed to pervert the law.9
The substantive version of rule of law includes the formal constitutional 
and institutional requirements, but the constitution, legislation and princi-
ples of law will only be valid if they comply with specific rule of law values. 
This version deems certain types of law as invalid if they do not meet cer-
tain requirements related to democratic principles, human rights, liberalism, 
market freedom and so on. For example, Rawls in A Theory of Justice pur-
sues a rule of law with inherent liberal principles which the political system 
must comply with in order to achieve a socially just society;10 Hayek’s rule 
of law has an economic aim by emphasising predictability as a necessity 
8 See for example Paul Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An 
Analytical Framework”, Public Law 467 (1997); A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of 
the Law of the Constitution (8th reprint edn., 1915); Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and its 
Virtue”, in Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, 210 (2nd edn., 
2009); R. Peerenboom, “Varieties of Rule of Law” in Asian Discourses of Rule of Law – 
Theories and Implementation of Rule of Law in Twelve Asian Countries, France and the 
US, 1 [R. Peerenboom (ed.), 2004]; Hayek, (n 6), 112-123; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 
53, 206-213 (1999); Kaarlo Tuori, Ratio and Voluntas: The Tension between Reason and 
Will in Law, 207-239 (2011); Henrik Andersen, “China and the WTO Appellate Body’s 
Rule of Law”, 5 Global J. Comp. L. 146,150 (2016).
9 J. Raz, “The Rule of Law and Its Virtue,” in J. Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law 
and Morality 214 (2nd edn., OUP 2009).
10 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 53, 206-213 (1999).
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for individuals in deciding their own ends: “a kind of instrument of pro-
duction, helping people to predict the behaviour of those with whom they 
must collaborate, rather than as efforts toward the satisfaction of particular 
needs.”11 It is a rule of law of a society where government should only inter-
fere in order to preserve the spontaneous order of individuals’ demands on 
the market – to protect against planned economies.
In the view of the author, rule of law has certain inherent values in order 
to ensure its own supremacy. The rule of law provides for predictability 
in the constitutional and legal order. Individuals, corporations and public 
institutions must know in advance their rights and obligations in all aspects 
of society, and, in particular, individuals must know, their basic rights 
and freedoms.12 Thus, there must be transparency in laws, governmental 
administration and execution of law, and in the political processes where 
law-making goes through clear procedures, and where the constitutional 
rights and natural justice of the individuals are protected by law-makers 
and the government. The rule of law protects all societal members’ access 
to justice. Such protection should be ensured by independent and impartial 
institutions, like constitutional and regular courts. They ensure the func-
tionality of the particular constitutional and legal system and guarantee the 
supremacy of law. Finally, the rule of law ensures equality between the mem-
bers and institutions of society in the context of law, as no one can be above 
the law, and no one can have a higher status than others in a case before the 
court of law. For example, the government cannot have a special status in 
a case against an individual.13 Thus it incorporates the elements proposed 
by Raz but it does not escape a normative function as it provides judgment 
against constitutions and laws which do not meet those essential rule of law 
requirements. For example, it will reject a law which creates obstacles for an 
individual’s access to the courts against the government.14
11 Hayek, (n 6), 113.
12 The European Court of Human Rights has also developed a practice where corporations to 
some extent have certain basic rights and freedoms which are protected by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. See for example case law concerning fair trial, Dombo 
Beheer BV v. Netherlands, Series A, 274, 1993 ECHR 49 : (1994) 18 EHRR 213; or right 
to privacy, Société Colas Est v. France, Case No. 37971/97 ECHR 2002-III.
13 H. Andersen, “China and the WTO Appellate Body’s Rule of Law”, 5 Global J. Comp. L 
146,150 (2016).
14 For example, in the context of UK constitutional and public law, which has supremacy 
of Parliament as a basic constitutional principle, it is deeply concerning when Parliament 
attempts to reduce the access to reviews by courts of decisions by governmental institutions 
through ouster clauses. The courts are reluctant to apply such clauses and interpret them 
narrowly. See for example Anisminic Ltd v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 
AC 147 : (1969) 2 WLR 163.
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Rule of law and International Law
Rule of law in national systems will often be instrumental in protecting the 
individual against government. There will often be a vertical power struc-
ture as the individual must comply with laws enacted by law-makers and 
must comply with decisions from executive bodies. In that sense, the individ-
ual might appear to be the weaker party, economically and politically. But 
rule of law ensures that under law, the government will not have a priority 
over the individual and cannot make arbitrary decisions without potentially 
being held accountable and liable under law. The picture is different when 
rule of law is applied on an international level. There is no overall interna-
tional law-making or executive institutions, and apart from certain princi-
ples with character of jus cogens, the binding effect of international norms 
and acceptance of international institutions’ interpretative and jurisdictional 
authority will often be considered as a result of the state’s own conduct 
through treaty consent and ratification, state practice and opinio juris, or 
principles of international law originating in national systems. Thus in con-
trast to the national system, the subject of international law, the state, is 
also the law-maker and the executive. Traditional international law theories 
have state sovereignty as the legitimate basis of international law,15 which 
makes the state, not the law, the supreme institution; a state can choose to 
enter into a treaty as well as leave it. However, the concepts and theories 
of state sovereignty and rule of law are more nuanced.16 It is not the aim 
in this article to engage into discussions about various types of state sover-
eignty. It is a concept which does not have clear authoritative definitions in 
international law. The UN Charter provides in its preamble the faith in the 
“equal rights (…) of nations large and small”, and territorial integrity and 
political independence of all states.17 Furthermore, the UN Assembly has 
adopted certain principles reflecting the ideas of sovereignty.18 Even though 
15 See L. Oppenheim, “The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method”, 2 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 313 (1908).
16 See for example Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy, (1999); Andrew Coleman 
and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, “‘Westphalian’ Meets ‘Eastphalian’ Sovereignty: China 
in a Globalized World”, 3 Asian J. Int’l. Law 237, 241-245 (2013).
17 UN Charter, Art. 2, ¶ 4.
18 UN General Assembly Resolution 2625(XXV) of 24 October 1970, “Declaration on 
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,” A/RES/25/2625. The prin-
ciples are: “a. The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, b. The 
principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, c. The duty 
not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance 
with the Charter, d. The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance 
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these principles do not provide a definition of “sovereignty” as a concept 
of international law, they indicate some normative dimensions associated 
with “sovereignty” as independent territories, which are recognised by other 
states, where domestic governing bodies have exclusive legislative, executive, 
and judicial authority.
Where rule of law provides equality and protection of the individual’s 
access to justice against an economically and politically stronger party, like 
a government or multinational corporation, a traditional view of interna-
tional law does not provide such division between the strong and the weak. 
All states are considered to be equal, no state can interfere into another 
state’s internal matters, and a state is only bound by international treaties if 
it has given consent as well as ratified them. The international community 
cannot impose rules on other states. Thus, the vertical power structure, as 
seen between state and citizen does not ceteris paribus exist between states 
from a traditional international law perspective.
Nevertheless, rule of law not only protect citizens against a state, but 
also provides the agents, institutions, and states with expectations of lawful 
behaviour by other members of a particular system. Not only does inter-
national law provide expectations between states, but it also creates legal 
expectations of citizens of a state-expectations that the international obliga-
tions taken by their respective states, which they directly or indirectly may 
benefit from, are complied with by the states.19 According to the UN General 
Assembly:
“We recognize that the rule of law applies to all States equally, and 
to international Organizations, including the United Nations and its 
principal organs, and that respect for and promotion of the rule of 
law and justice should guide all of their activities and accord pre-
dictability and legitimacy to their actions. We also recognize that all 
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the 
State itself, are accountable to just, fair and equitable laws and are 
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.”20
with the Charter, e. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, f. The 
principle of sovereign equality of States, g. The principle that States shall fulfil in good 
faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.”
19 It is an expectation which has its basis in a fundamental principle of international law–
pacta sunt servanda, which is reflected in Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which implies that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.” This article later discusses the “direct effect” 
and the link between national and international systems.
20 General Assembly of the United Nations 2012, “Declaration of the High-Level Meeting 
of the General Assembly on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels”, 
2019 IndIa – solar cells and mexIco – Taxes on sofT drInks 67
Where the General Assembly distinguishes between rule of law and 
human rights, the UN Secretary General has provided a more substantive 
version of rule of law:
“The “rule of law” is a concept at the very heart of the Organization’s 
mission. It refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State 
itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent 
with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, 
as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy 
of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness 
in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and pro-
cedural and legal transparency.”21
A difference between rule of law at national and international level is 
that the constitutional and institutional structures at international level 
are weaker than in national systems. Nevertheless, the distinction between 
national and international is reducing with the move into organizations and 
their jurisdictional discourses. Numerous international organizations and 
international rules and principles provide mechanisms with rule of law char-
acter, although with a lesser degree of maturity and strength in comparison 
to domestic level.
There are various international law instruments to handle legal uncer-
tainty and support predictability in the international order. In respect of 
law-making, there is not a single constitution on international level pro-
viding a set of rules governing law-making at international level. However, 
there are various international instruments with constitutional traits provid-
ing rules and guidance in that respect. For example, the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) provides rules on treaty making, applica-
tion, termination, and reference to jus cogens; and the UN Charter provides 
rules legitimatizing the supranational character of UN Council Resolutions 
and its mandate. There are also more constitutionally based rules in specific 
organizations, like the WTO, providing a forum for treaty negotiations con-
cerning trade in goods, services and intellectual property rights, and to have 
bodies with authority to make final interpretations of WTO treaties, and 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to make de facto binding decisions in 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 September 2012, A/RES/67/1, ¶ 2.
21 Secretary General of the United Nations, 2004, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 
in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies”, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations 
Security Council, 23 August 2004, S/2004/616.
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case of disputes. However, international organizations do only to a limited 
extent have a direct authority to impose sanctions on individuals, but where 
they do, there must be the basic guarantees of natural justice to protect 
the individual. For example, international criminal law applies not only to 
governments but also individuals. Principles of natural justice are written 
into the treaties, like Part V and VI of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).
Furthermore, international law can require states to comply with princi-
ples of natural justice. For example, WTO law allows states to target spe-
cific companies for dumping the prices but at the same time provides rules 
to ensure natural justice is followed in the states’ handling of antidumping 
investigations.22 WTO law influences business transactions on global scale 
directly and therefore companies should have clarity in respect of, for exam-
ple, antidumping law. There are also principles of natural justice applied in 
inter-state disputes. For example, the AB has made a reference to due process 
and good faith in the panel and AB proceedings.23 The obvious problem 
from a multilevel approach is that one set of law may conflict with another 
set of law and thus raises the question about which law will prevail.
The rule of law protects the access to justice delivered by an impartial 
and independent institution. There are a number of international courts 
and tribunals offering such access and they are required under treaties to 
be independent. For example, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) must 
have independent judges,24 the same applies to the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),25 the ICC,26 and to the WTO; panels and 
AB.27 However, one challenge is that international law generally has states 
as subjects and does not provide access to citizens. There are some excep-
tions to this, such as regional human rights courts which provide standing 
22 See for example, Art. 6 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and WTO case law; H. 
Andersen, “WTO Antidumping Jurisprudence and Rule of Law Challenges”, in Festskrift 
til Christina Moëll 11-33 [Pernilla Rendahl, Mats Tjernberg, and Henrik Wenander (eds.), 
2017].
23 See for example “United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services”, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 20 April 2005, 
¶ 268-276.
24 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, Art. 2.
25 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 I.L.M. 
1261 (1982) Art. 2.
26 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, preamble and Art. 
40 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
27 DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules, “Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes”, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), Art. 8 ¶ 2 and Art. 17 [hereinafter 
Dispute Settlement Understanding]; Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Rule 2.
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for individuals. Also the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) provides access to individuals to make claims against 
states. Otherwise, it is a question of national courts letting international law 
penetrate into the domestic order which is dealt with below.
Another challenge concerning access to justice is when some parties do 
not recognize the jurisdiction of a court, and hinder another state’s access to 
justice.28 In WTO disputes, the WTO Dispute Settlement System is compul-
sory for all WTO Members through the WTO Treaties.29
The third challenge is the limited reviewing power of international courts 
over national governments’ implementation of the procedural principles 
of natural justice. Nevertheless, regional human rights courts have a high 
degree of reviewing power over national law’s conformity with human rights 
law. Further, the AB has a de facto reviewing power of national law and 
constitutions and their conformity with WTO law.30 Even if national law 
may potentially violate WTO law, it can be subject to review by panels and 
the AB.31 They cannot invalidate national law but it is a requirement that 
the WTO Members bring national measures into conformity with WTO law 
promptly.32
Finally, the requirement that all are equal under the law also applies on 
international level although in a weaker version. As mentioned above, a 
basic element of traditional theories of international law is that states are 
equal. However, the access to justice in inter-state disputes can have some 
reservations similar to the South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of 
Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China) mentioned previously. For 
example, the ICJ can only handle disputes where the states have recognized 
its jurisdiction which can be inter alia by special agreement or by declara-
tion by respective states recognizing the ICJ’s judgments as compulsory.33 
The ICC has no jurisdiction in cases of crimes committed by nationals from 
28 Republic of Philippines v. People’s Republic of China, PCA Case No. 2013-19, Final 
Award (12 July 2016).
29 Dispute Settlement Understanding, Art. 3.
30 See for example AB’s critique of the panel in “United States — Countervailing and Anti-
dumping Measures on Certain Products from China”, WT/DS449/AB/R, adopted by the 
DSB on 22 July 2014, where the AB could not complete the analysis as the panel had erro-
neously only focused on practices of national administrative authorities without taking 
into account the courts’ interpretation of the constitutionality of US countervailing duty 
law, ¶ 4.182-4.183.
31 See for example the “as such” practice; “United States — Anti-Dumping Act of 1916”, 
WT/DS136/AB/R and WT/DS162/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 26 September 2000.
32 Dispute Settlement Understanding, Art. 21.
33 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, Art. 36.
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US, China, India, and Russia etc.34 Thus, the equality which exists on the 
international level must be understood in the context of the respective inter-
national organizations, courts and the like, and of the states which have rat-
ified the specific treaties recognizing the jurisdiction of the respective courts 
or tribunals. In respect of WTO, there are 164 Members. They are all bound 
to use the WTO DSB in case of a dispute and if the recommendations from 
panels and the AB are adopted by the DSB, the member states must comply 
with those recommendations, albeit a recommendation can be rejected by 
the DSB if there is full consensus among all the WTO Members.
As mentioned in the introduction, former members of the AB have 
addressed the rule of law developments and promotion in WTO AB juris-
prudence. There are rule of law elements being developed on international 
level, and it is reasonable to refer to rule of law in the context of interna-
tional law. However, there are several challenges with rules of law in various 
regimes, and levels when there is overlap between specific legal or constitu-
tional regimes.
Rule of Law as a Multilevel Concept and Its Challenges
The UN General Assembly promotes a multilevel rule of law - one that 
applies to individuals, private and public actors, states and international 
organizations. Where a rule of law might work at national level, and to a 
lesser degree function at international level, the multilevel rule of law poses 
challenges in the interface and connection between different levels and sys-
tems of constitutional and legal orders with their respective sets of values, 
different constitutional and legal cultures,35 and different types of political 
systems, all of which inevitably affect the type of rule of law associated 
with the respective order. Thus the various rules of law cannot easily be 
drawn into one narrowly defined rule with sharp contours. The overall rule 
of law elements discussed above are subject to variation depending on the 
respective constitutional, political and legal systems and differ in degree and 
maturity.
In order to overcome rule of law gaps and to provide predictability when 
constitutional and legal norms from various regimes overlap and intercon-
nect, there are specific constitutional, institutional and/or legal mechanisms 
to facilitate the interconnection. Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks and India 
34 See Rome Statute, Art. 12.
35 See more about legal cultures; Colin Picker, “Comparative Legal Cultural Analyses of 
International Economic Law: Insights, Lessons and Approaches”, 6 Ind. J. of Intl. Econ. 
L. 54 (2014). See for discussion of constitutional cultures and rule of law; Kaarlo Tuori, 
Ratio and Voluntas: The Tension between Reason and Will in Law (2011).
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– Solar Cells concern two of such challenges in the context of Art. XX (d) of 
GATT 1994. They are:
  The connection of international law and national law.
  The overlaps and scope of laws and regulations from different provid-
ers of international law.
The first challenge about the connection of international law and national 
law addresses the scope of legal effect of international norms on national 
systems. Traditionally, the monist/dualist theory assumes that international 
law and national law are two distinct systems.36 A monist approach consid-
ers the international norms as part of the national system, whereas the dual-
ist approach will only confer rights to individuals inside the national system 
if it has been incorporated into national law. There is a debate in literature 
about the appropriateness of the dualist/monist theory and the doctrine in 
light of globalization and the supranational character of some international 
and regional norms.37 Where each state has its own mechanisms regarding 
the access for citizens to apply international law, like incorporation through 
legislative measures or direct effect through the courts, it also gives expec-
tations to citizens from other states. For example, in antidumping situations 
there can be a producer from India, who is targeted with an antidumping 
duty by the EU, and who wants to make claims based on WTO law against 
the EU institutions before the EU judiciaries.38 The main problem is that for 
market agents it can be difficult to anticipate whether international rights 
and obligations can be relied upon in a national system, and thus the market 
agent may be in a situation where there is different sets of laws available at 
the national and international level, but no certainty as to which of the laws 
will apply.
The second challenge concerns cross-sectorial overlap: when two or more 
international systems claim jurisdictional and/or interpretative authority 
36 See for example a reflection of Hans Kelsen’s monistic theory in François Rigaux, Hans 
Kelsen on International Law, 9 Eur. J. Int’l. Law 325 (1998).
37 See for example Armin von Bogdandy, “Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On 
the Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law”, 6 Intl. J. of 
Const. L., 397, 399-401 (2008); Xiuyan Fei, “Direct Effect of WTO Rulings: The Case for 
Conditional Recognition”, 13 US-China L. Rev. 491, 492 (2016).
38 There are several examples of exporters from outside the EU making claims based on 
WTO law before the EU judiciaries. See for example; Case T-35/01, Shanghai Teraoka 
Electronic Co. Ltd v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 28 October 2004, EU:T:2004:317; Case T-143/06, MTZ Polyfilms Ltd. v. 
Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) 
of 17 November 2009, EU:T:2009:441; and Case T-512/09 RENV, Rusal Armenal ZAO 
v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the General Court of 25 January 2017, 
EU:T:2017:26.
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to regulate and/or decide an issue which has multiple anchors in different 
regimes. For example, the WTO does not provide any explicit rules con-
cerning protection of labour which to a large extent is regulated through the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). The question is to what extent 
the AB can reject a state access to impose discriminatory measures against 
another state, which does not comply with its ILO commitments, and which 
by violating the ILO obligations is getting a competitive advantage in the 
market.39 Thus there can potentially be overlaps between WTO and ILO 
law and a risk that a rejection of the discriminatory measures can lead other 
states to also violate ILO law in order to safeguard their industries. That 
will undermine the rule of law, as law from one system will appear to have 
lesser weight and the access to justice from that particular system might be 
eliminated.
Rule of law is a doctrine which is being developed on international level 
at different paces and with different levels of maturity and with variations 
in the respective regimes. It needs to be refined to encompass the multilevel 
challenges. There are some theoretical and normative tools in theories of 
constitutional pluralism where meta-principles are developed which to some 
extent guide the norm overlaps.40 That could for example be the reference 
to human rights in the UN Charter,41 and in the VCLT,42 the recognition of 
principles of jus cogens,43 due process principles applied and developed at 
39 See for example Henrik Andersen, “Core Workers’ Rights as Constitutional Principles in 
the WTO?” in Festskrift − Liber Amicarum et Amicorum in Honour of Ruth Nielsen, 31 
[Christina Tvarnø, Ulla Neergaard, Jens Fejø, and Grith Ølykke (eds.) DJØF Forlag 2013].
40 See about constitutionalization at international level and constitutional pluralism; Neil 
Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 Mod. L. Rev. 317 (2002); Alec Stone 
Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes”, 16 Ind. J. 
Global Legal Stud. 621 (2009); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “International Economic 
Law, ‘Public Reason’, and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods”, 14 
J. Int’l Econ. L. 23 (2011); Henrik Andersen, “Protection of Non-Trade Values in WTO 
Appellate Body Jurisprudence: Exceptions, Economic Arguments, and Eluding Questions”, 
18 J. Int’l Econ. L. 383 (2015).
41 See the preamble of the UN Charter which provides that “We the Peoples of the United 
Nations determined (…) to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small.”
42 See preamble of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties “The States Parties to the 
present Convention (…) Having in mind the principles of international law embodied in 
the Charter of the United Nations, such as the principles of the equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples, of the sovereign equality and independence of all States, of non-in-
terference in the domestic affairs of States, of the prohibition of the threat or use of force 
and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all.”
43 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Art. 
53; jurisprudence from the ICJ, inter alia, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), ICJ Reports 1986, 14, and Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), ICJ Reports 2012; Report 
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international level,44 and the rule of law development at international level. 
But the idea of developing constitutional meta-principles is challenged by 
other theories like legal pluralism.45 Referring to meta-principles as clari-
fying multilevel rule of law challenges requires support from various actors 
at national, regional and international level. The normative force of con-
stitutional meta-principles might be stronger reflected over time through 
practices by various institutions and through their cross-referencing to each 
other’s respective practices where institutions like panels and AB can be 
influential. But it is a process which is slowly being developed. The remain-
der of the article will address Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 and relevant panel 
and AB jurisprudence and discuss multilevel rule of law challenges.
aRt. xx (D) of gatt 1994
Introduction
The WTO is based on market economy principles aiming at an efficient 
allocation of resources.46 The means used for this are opening up the global 
market through elimination of trade restrictions and reduction of tariffs. 
The core principles to achieve the aims are non-discrimination principles, 
transparency in laws, regulations and practices, market access, and counter 
measures against unfair trading practices. The market based values of the 
WTO must be seen in context of non-trade values, like public morals, pro-
tection of human, animal and plant life and health, protection of exhaust-
ible resources, etc. Non-trade values are protected through exceptions to 
the general rules of WTO law and enshrined in Art. XX of GATT 1994,47 
concerning goods, and in Art. XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). The main focus of this article is on Art. XX of GATT 
of the International Law Commission, Sixty-sixth session (5 May-6 June and 7 July-8 
August 2014), Supplement No. 10 (A/69/10), Annex.
44 See above with reference to natural justice in the WTO and ICC systems.
45 See for example Nico Krisch, “The Case for Pluralism book chapter in Postnational 
Law” in The Worlds of European Constitutionalism 203 [G. de Búrca & J.H.H. Weiler, 
(eds.), Cambridge University Press 2012]; and Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, 
“Fragmentation of International Law? – Postmodern Anxieties”, 15 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 553 (2002).
46 See the preamble of the WTO Agreement.
47 Non-trade values may also be protected by other means. See Henrik Andersen, “Protection 
of Non-Trade Values in WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence: Exceptions, Economic 
Arguments, and Eluding Questions”, 18 J. Int’l Econ. L. 383 (2015).
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1994, but it will also draw on practice concerning Art. XIV of GATS which 
is textually similar to Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994.48
Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 protects measures which are necessary in 
order to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. There are three con-
ditions for applying Art. XX (d):
 1) that the “laws or regulations” with which compliance is being secured 
are themselves “not inconsistent” with WTO law;
 2) that the measures are “necessary to secure compliance” with those 
laws or regulations;
 3) that the measures are “not applied in a manner which would con-
stitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restric-
tion on international trade”.49
There is a considerable number of cases from the GATT and WTO judi-
ciaries concerning the application and interpretation of Art. XX (d) GATT 
1994.50 The impression is that the if a responding state fails to meet the 
criteria, then the application of Art. XX (d) is generally rejected by pan-
els and the AB with only a few exceptions. For example, in US – Spring 
Assemblies,51 the US International Trade Commission (ITC) had issued an 
order to exclude the import of automotive spring assemblies which were 
violating specific patents. The legal basis for the ITC order was Section 337 
of the United States Tariff Act of 1930, which provides that it is unlawful 
to have “unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation 
of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, 
consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy 
48 The AB has made cross-interpretations between Art. XX of GATT 1994 and Art. XIV of 
GATS. See for example, “United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services”, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 20 April 2005, 
¶ 291-292.
49 Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 provides: “Subject to the requirement that such measures 
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifia-
ble discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent 
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (…) (d) necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of 
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of 
patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices.” See from 
case law; GATT Panel Report, “United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930”, 
L/6439, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, ¶ 5.22.
50 GATT 1947 from the GATT era.
51 GATT Panel Report, “United States — Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies”, 
L/5333, adopted 26 May 1983, BISD 30S/107.
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or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, 
in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, 
or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States”. 
Canada claimed that the US order violated Art. III and Art. XI para. 1 of 
GATT 1947. The US, on the other side, contended that the enforcement 
through Section 337 was necessary to ensure compliance with its domestic 
law for the protection of patents.52 This was the view which was shared by 
the panel.53
The following sub-parts will briefly provide an overview of cases where 
the criteria were not met.
i. Laws and Regulations Not Consistent with GATT 1994
As mentioned above, US – Spring Assemblies seems more to be an excep-
tion as panels and the AB often reject a claim with basis in Art. XX (d) of 
GATT 1994. In Japan – Agricultural Products,54 the panel found that even 
though the Japanese measures were necessary to secure compliance with the 
Japanese regulations, which should ensure that all trade of agricultural prod-
ucts would go through a monopoly, the regulations themselves were incon-
sistent with GATT 1947 and thus Art. XX (d) could not apply.55 In Brazil 
– Retreaded Tyres, the panel rejected Brazil’s claim that its fines imposed on 
importers of retreaded tyres could be justified under Art. XX (d) of GATT 
1994 to uphold an import ban on such tyres. The panel had found that the 
import ban was inconsistent with GATT 1994.56 In Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines), the panel rejected the application of Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 
as the Thai VAT laws, which Thailand wanted to secure compliance with, 
were inconsistent with WTO law. The panel had found that the VAT laws 
violated Art. III para. 4 of GATT 1994 as they imposed additional adminis-
trative requirements on imported cigarettes and therefore treated imported 
cigarettes less favourable than domestically produced cigarettes.57 The crite-
rion was met in Columbia – Textiles, where Panama claimed that Columbia 
52 Supra note 51, ¶41.
53 Supra note 51, ¶61.
54 GATT Panel Report, “Japan — Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products”, 
L/6253, adopted 2 March 1988, BISD 35S/163.
55 Supra note 55, ¶5.2.2.3.
56 “Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres”, WT/DS332/R, adopted by the 
DSB on 17 December 2007, ¶7.381-7.389. This part was not appealed.
57 “Thailand — Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines”, WT/
DS371/R, adopted by the DSB on 15 July 2011, ¶. 7.758. This part was not appealed to the 
AB, where the AB held that Thailand had not made a prima facie defence under Art. XX 
(d) of GATT 1994, cf. “Thailand — Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the 
Philippines”, WT/DS371/R, adopted by the DSB on 15 July 2011, ¶174-181.
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had not attempted to demonstrate that their money laundering laws were 
not inconsistent with GATT 1994; Columbia was seeking to comply with 
the laws through the contested measures. The panel rejected the argument 
by Panama, as it follows from case law that “a responding Member’s law 
should be treated as WTO-consistent until proven otherwise”.58 However, 
the application of Art. XX (d) was still rejected as Columbia failed the 
“necessity test”.59
ii. Not Demonstrated that Measures are “necessary to secure 
compliance” with the national laws or regulations
This criterion has two aspects: a test of whether measures can “secure com-
pliance”, and a necessity test.60 In Argentina – Financial Services,61 the AB 
stated that even though they are conceptually distinct, the necessity test and 
the interpretation of “secure compliance” may overlap, and that there can-
not be constructed a rigid method of analysing this criterion. It depends 
on the specific measures and laws in the case, and on the arguments by the 
parties.62
As mentioned above with reference to Columbia – Textiles, Columbia 
failed to demonstrate that its measures to combat money laundering were 
necessary. But there are several cases both from GATT and WTO case law 
where the responding state has failed the necessity test. In Canada – FIRA,63 
the panel was not persuaded by the use of the exception in Art. XX (d). 
Canada had introduced the Foreign Investment Review Act which required 
58 “Colombia — Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear”, 
WT/DS461//R, adopted by the DSB on 22 June 2016, ¶ 7.509-7.511. The panel referred 
to the principle from AB case law; “United States — Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany”, WT/DS213/AB/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 19 December 2002, ¶ 157. That part was not appealed to the AB. 
See also the panel in “Colombia — Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry”, 
WT/DS366/R, adopted by the DSB on 20 May 2009, ¶ 7.526-7.532; and panel in “China 
— Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts”, WT/DS339, WT/DS340, and WT/
DS342/R, adopted by the DSB on 12 January 2009, ¶ 7.288-7.296.
59 “Colombia — Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear”, 
WT/DS461/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 22 June 2016, ¶ 5.142-5.150.
60 The necessity test is found in other paragraphs of Art. XX and there is rich case law from 
GATT and WTO practice concerning its application. See also Mads Andenas and Stefan 
Zleptnig, “Proportionality: WTO Law: In A Comparative Perspective”, 42 Tex. Int’l L.J. 
371 (2007).
61 “Argentina — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services”, WT/DS453/AB/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 9 May 2016.
62 “Argentina — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services”, WT/DS453/AB/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 9 May 2016, ¶ 6.2015.
63 GATT Panel Report, “Canada — Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act”, 
L/5504, adopted 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140.
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that foreign acquisition of control of Canadian businesses should be sub-
ject to review by the Canadian authorities, and should only be allowed if 
it would benefit Canada. Foreign investors could submit undertakings to 
the Canadian authorities and they would mostly be a result of negotiations 
between the foreign investor and the Canadian authorities. The undertak-
ings could take the form of purchase undertakings where the foreign investor 
would accept to use Canadian products and supplies. The US claimed that 
the undertakings violated Art. III of GATT 1947, whereas Canada claimed 
that if they violated the national treatment principle they would be exempted 
under Art. XX (d) of GATT 1947. The panel rejected the Canadian argu-
ment. According to the panel, Canada had not demonstrated why it was nec-
essary – in order to secure compliance with the Foreign Investment Review 
Act – for foreign investors to bind themselves to purchase Canadian prod-
ucts or use Canadian supplies.64
Korea – Various Measures on Beef went through both the panel and the 
AB stages. Korea had introduced a dual retail system for the sales of meat 
where imported beef would only be sold at specialised stores. Korea claimed 
it was necessary to enforce its Unfair Competition Act against fraudulent 
misrepresentation of the origin of beef in the beef sector. The panel rejected 
the claim by Korea. The AB agreed with the conclusions of the panel and 
consequently rejected Korea’s claim. According to both the panel and the 
AB, Korea had not demonstrated that there were not less trade restrictive 
alternatives to detect fraud in the beef sector, as Korea otherwise had done in 
the past, and thus failed the necessity test of Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994.65 In 
Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, the panel found that 
the Dominican Republic’s requirement that tax stamp be affixed to cigarette 
packets violated the national treatment principle as it added extra processes 
and costs on the importers. The Dominican Republic did not appeal the 
panel’s finding concerning the violation of the national treatment principle. 
Instead, the Dominican Republic appealed the panel’s rejection of the claim 
that the measures were necessary to comply with laws on tax evasion and 
the smuggling of cigarettes. The panel found that the measures were not nec-
essary as there were less trade restrictive measures reasonably available for 
the Dominican Republic. The AB agreed with the panel, as the Dominican 
Republic could have made tax stamps for exporters which they could affix 
during the course of production of the cigarette packets.66
64 Supra note 63, ¶5.20.
65 “Korea — Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef”, WT/DS161/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 10 January 2001, ¶ 152-185.
66 “Dominican Republic — Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of 
Cigarettes”, WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 19 May 2005, ¶ 57-73. See also 
from AB case law rejection of appeal concerning “necessity”; joined cases “United States 
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In respect of securing compliance with laws and regulations, the panel 
held in US – Gasoline, that US’ discriminatory baseline methods, which 
were methods to determine the quality of gasoline, were not an enforce-
ment system and could therefore not “secure compliance” and be exempted 
under Art. XX (d).67 In Canada – Periodicals, the panel found that Canada’s 
Tariff Code 9958 could not be seen as an enforcement measure for Canada’s 
Income Tax Act. Tariff Code 9958 prohibited the import of periodicals with 
advertisements directed at the Canadian market unless similar advertise-
ments were found in the country of origin of the periodical. Canada claimed 
that it was necessary to have this prohibition as the Income Tax Act allowed 
tax deduction for expenses for advertisements placed in Canadian periodi-
cals only, and not for expenses for advertisements in foreign periodicals. The 
panel found that the aim of the Income Tax Act was to motivate advertise-
ments in Canadian periodicals, and therefore the Tariff Code 9958 did not 
“secure compliance” with the Income Tax Act.68
iii. Means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade
This criterion relates to the chapeau of Art. XX of GATT 1994 and the 
textually similar Art. XIV of GATS. In the context of Art. XX (d) of GATT 
1994, the panel found in Argentina – Hides and Leather that even though 
Argentina’s measures to combat tax evasion were necessary to secure com-
pliance with its tax laws, they could not be justified under the chapeau of 
Art. XX. The higher interest rates imposed on imported goods compared 
to domestic goods were not in themselves unjustifiable, but the fact that 
the additional loss of interests suffered by the importers considered as an 
— Measures Relating to Shrimp from Thailand” and “United States — Customs Bond 
Directive for Merchandise Subject to Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duties”, WT/DS343/
AB/R and WT/DS345/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 1 August 2008, ¶ 304-319; “Colombia 
— Measures Relating to the Importation of Textiles, Apparel and Footwear”, WT/DS461/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 22 June 2016, ¶ 5.142-5.150; and from panel case law, 
“Canada — Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain”, 
WT/DS276/R, adopted by the DSB on 27 September 2004, ¶ 6.215-6.251; “European 
Communities — Protection of Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs”, WT/DS290/R, adopted by the DSB on 20 April 2005, paras 
7.328-7.341; “Colombia — Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry”, WT/
DS366/R, adopted by the DSB on 20 May 2009, ¶ 7..545-7.620.
67 “United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline”, WT/DS2/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 20 May 1996, ¶ 6.32-6.33.
68 “Canada — Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals”, WT/DS31/R, adopted by the DSB 
on 30 July 1997, ¶ 5.6-5.11. See also from panel case law, “China — Measures Affecting 
Imports of Automobile Parts”, WT/DS339, WT/DS340, and WT/DS342/R, adopted by the 
DSB on 12 January 2009, ¶ 7.298-7.346.
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additional tax burden could not be justified under the chapeau of Art. 
XX of GATT 1994.69 Regarding Art. XIV (c) of GATS, the panel found in 
Argentina – Financial Services70 that Argentina could not apply Art. XIV (c) 
of GATS. Argentina had various financial measures and tax measures which 
distinguished between countries which cooperated for tax transparency pur-
poses and countries which did not cooperate. The countries which did not 
have a cooperation agreement with Argentina would get less a favourable 
treatment. Argentina held that the measures were necessary to secure com-
pliance with their tax laws on evading tax, money laundering, and fraudu-
lent transactions. Even though the measures could be considered necessary 
to secure compliance with Argentine tax laws, they constituted arbitrary 
discrimination as Argentina designated cooperative status to some countries 
which it did not have a tax transparency agreement with. Thus, there was no 
clear criteria for designating countries with cooperative status.
iv. Balancing between Free Trade and Protectionism
Panels and the AB do not take a narrow approach to the interpretation of 
exceptions. As the AB stated in EC – Hormones,71 it is not stipulated that 
a different methodology should be applied to exceptions as to the general 
rules. The aim of Art. XX (d) is to secure that national systems can ensure 
that compliance with its laws and regulations is not put in jeopardy by the 
general principles of WTO law as long as the national laws and regulations 
are in conformity with WTO law. The rule protects national law and lets 
the protection of national law be a legitimate basis for overriding the WTO 
free trade principles. If it had no qualifications, the WTO Members could 
use Art. XX (d) as a political instrument to protect national production 
against foreign competition, favouring some states over others, and also as a 
bargaining tool against the other WTO partners. That would undermine the 
whole purpose of WTO law and would eliminate the idea of rule of law at 
WTO level. The qualifications stipulated in Art. XX (d) serve to balance the 
WTO principles with a legitimate protection of national law while avoiding 
national protectionism.72
69 “Argentina — Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished 
Leather”, WT/DS155/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 February 2001, paras 11.285-11.331.
70 The panel’s finding was later upheld by the AB. “Argentina — Measures Relating to Trade 
in Goods and Services”, WT/DS453/R and WT/DS453/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 9 
May 2016.
71 “European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)”, 
WT/DS26 and WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 13 February 1998, ¶104.
72 See for example statements concerning the chapeau of Art. XX, AB in “United States — 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline”, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted by the 
DSB on 20 May 1996, at pp. 22 and 25, and panel in “Argentina — Measures Affecting 
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From a case law perspective, the “necessity” test is the biggest hurdle 
for the national governments, and the approach by the AB has attracted 
critique in literature.73 It is not the aim to engage in that discussion here, but 
only emphasise that consistency in the methodological approach is a rule 
of law requirement imposed on judiciaries and governmental institutions.74 
The AB has not deviated from its approach wherein the responding state 
must demonstrate that there are not less trade restrictive measures avail-
able. However, the AB has developed a practice where the objects, which 
are sought to be protected by national measures, are categorised in order 
of importance which may reflect the necessity analysis with lesser require-
ments for measures protecting vital objectives, like human health. It is not 
clear what basis the AB has used for such categorization and for develop-
ing variation in the necessity tests.75 Apart from such general challenges in 
respect of Art. XX, the cases concerning Art. XX (d) demonstrate multilevel 
challenges:
 1) the delicate balance of protecting national law with measures and 
institutions guaranteeing law to be upheld by ensuring that foreign 
products meet the same national standards as national products. 
Different standards between states can be a problem in the importing 
state which cannot easily monitor production methods and product 
standards of the exporting state. It is a multilevel rule of law problem 
if the importing state, in order to comply with WTO law, cannot 
have specific measures targeted at foreign products to ensure that 
they meet the requirements under national law as it would otherwise 
create inequality between the national and the foreign producers; and
the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather”, WT/DS155/R, adopted 
by the DSB on 16 February 2001, ¶11.312.
73 See for example, Gisele Kapterian, “A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on ‘Necessity’”, 
59 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 89 (2010).
74 It should also be noted that both panels and the AB, and third parties rely on jurisprudence 
from panels and the AB. It indicates that panels and the AB interpretations if consistently 
applied will add positively to the openness and predictability of law and its methodologies, 
and thus be part of shaping a rule of law in the WTO. It should be noted that in “United 
States — Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico”, WT/DS344/
AB/R, adopted on 20 May 2008, para 160, the AB made it clear to the panel that its deci-
sions have a high legal value – and in other words stated their stare decisis-like characteris-
tics where it is expected that if the AB has provided an interpretation of a WTO provision 
and a similar legal question arises in a subsequent case, the case will be resolved in the 
same way. See also Alec Stone Sweet and Brunell characterizing the AB as a Trustee court; 
A. Stone Sweet & T.L. Brunell, “Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International 
Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization”, 1 Journal of Law and 
Courts 61 (2013).
75 See Henrik Andersen, “Protection of Non-Trade Values in WTO Appellate Body 
Jurisprudence: Exceptions, Economic Arguments, and Eluding Questions”, 18 J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 383, 397 (2015).
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 2) upholding WTO law by ensuring that there is no discrimination exer-
cised by national governments against foreign products, or if such 
discrimination is allegedly serving to uphold national laws and reg-
ulations, that such measures are not applied as protectionist tools to 
reduce or eliminate foreign competition.
Panels and AB must strike a balance between these considerations and 
between national law and WTO law. In that exercise, they are reviewing 
national laws’ compliance with WTO law and thus upholding rule of law at 
WTO level. At the same time, they are challenging the rule of law at national 
level for those market agents who have their legal expectations anchored in 
the national rules. Apart from the obvious violations of WTO law, it can 
hardly be easy for market agents to see through WTO law and national law, 
and confirm whether national law is in conformity with WTO law. That 
might decrease as the panel and the AB develop their case law and maintain 
consistency. With such examples, it is more likely that the WTO Members 
can construct their national laws in conformity with their own expectations 
about WTO law derived from the interpretations by panels and the AB.
Where these cases concerned measures to uphold national laws and regu-
lations, the following parts of this article will take an international dimen-
sion and discuss the multilevel challenges in the application of Art. XX (d) 
of GATT 1994 in the context of international law.
mexico – taxes on soft DRinks
Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks has in particular three issues of interest in 
light of multilevel rule of law challenges: the jurisdiction of WTO panels and 
the AB concerning disputes from other regimes; the application of interna-
tional law in the WTO regime; and the connection between international 
law and domestic law.
Jurisdictional Issues and the Application of International 
Law
Mexico had imposed certain tax measures on soft drinks which contained 
sweeteners other than cane sugar. The US claimed that Mexico violated the 
national treatment principle as cane sugar was predominantly a Mexican 
product and accounted for more than 95% of the sweetener production in 
Mexico. The rules would effectively exclude Mexican soft drinks from the 
tax. Mexico claimed that its taxes on soft drinks fell outside the jurisdiction 
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of the WTO panel as this dispute was already being adjudicated under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). According to Mexico, the 
US and Mexico had negotiated a balanced sweetener trade regime under the 
NAFTA, which was now in dispute. The US refused to take the dispute to 
the NAFTA dispute settlement system. By imposing the tax on sweeteners 
other than cane sugar, Mexico sought to rebalance the trade loss result-
ing from the US violation of the sweetener trade regime under the NAFTA. 
Mexico argued that on that account, the issue should be a matter for the 
NAFTA Arbitral Panel, and not the WTO panel. However, the WTO Panel 
rejected Mexico’s claim, holding that it had no discretion to reject jurisdic-
tion of a case properly before it.
Mexico later appealed the part of the panel report pertaining to deter-
mination of jurisdiction, and made the same claim before the AB. They 
asserted that by complaining against Mexico in the WTO DSB, and at the 
same time refusing Mexico access to justice in the NAFTA system, the US 
had prejudiced its right to apply WTO law. The AB noted that there had 
not been no resolution of the dispute between Mexico and the US on the 
NAFTA level. It further rejected Mexico’s reference to the principle of nemo 
ex propria turpitudine commodum capere potest (no one should profit from 
his own wrong)76 and the reference to the decision by the Permanent Court 
of International Justice in Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) where 
it stated that “(…) one party cannot avail himself of the fact that the other 
has not fulfilled some obligation, or has not had recourse to some means 
of redress, if the former party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter 
from fulfilling the obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tri-
bunal which would have been open to him.”77. According to the AB, even if 
the principle of nemo ex propria turpitudine commodum capere potest was 
to be applicable in the case, it would imply that the AB would have to make 
a decision concerning the alleged NAFTA infringement in order to establish 
wrongdoing as an element of the principle. The AB referred to Art. 3.2 of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which stipulates that the WTO 
DSB “serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the 
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agree-
ments”. Thus, there is no mandate for WTO panels or the AB to decide 
disputes outside of the WTO regime.
76 See more about the development of this principle in public international law; Robert Kolb, 
La maxime “nemo ex propria turpitudine commodum capere potest” (nul ne peut profiter 
de son propre tort) en droit international public (The Maxim “nemo ex propria turpi-
tudine commodum capere potest” (no one should profit from his own wrong) in public 
international law), 1 Rev. b. dr. I’ntl84 (2000).
77 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) (Jurisdiction), 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 9, 31.
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In this context, the rule of law issues pertain to the traditional assump-
tion that the state is the sovereign law-maker of international law. States 
confer mandates on various international bodies to exclusively administrate 
and interpret the respective treaties of their regimes, but provide only a few 
tools to handle cross-sectorial overlaps. That creates uncertainty for the 
market agents. It seems clear from Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks that the 
panel and the AB recognize their jurisdictional limit. They did not inter-
fere into a potential dispute in the NAFTA system where the US allegedly 
violated NAFTA law. However, that is not the full extent of the potential 
overlap between WTO law and law of other regimes. It will later be dis-
cussed whether the AB crossed into the law of El Mercado Común del Sur 
(MERCOSUR)78 in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres.
Another element of uncertainty is that the AB seems vague about the 
applicability of the principle of nemo ex propria turpitudine commodum 
capere potest. The WTO agreement and its treaties do not provide a cat-
alogue of sources. Art. 3.2 of the DSU emphasises that the panel and AB 
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations of the WTO Members 
under the WTO treaties. In Korea – Procurement, the panel stated that “to 
the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency, or an expression in a cov-
ered WTO agreement that implies differently, we are of the view that the 
customary rules of international law apply to the WTO treaties and to the 
process of treaty formation under the WTO.”79 Apart from this case, there 
is little guidance from WTO case law about the application of sources other 
than the WTO treaties as a basis for independent claims before the WTO 
judiciaries.80
However, what is clearer from case law is the application of principles 
of international law as an interpretative context for the WTO treaties.81 
Art. 3.2. of the DSU provides that WTO treaties must be interpreted in 
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law, where the VCLT reflects the customary rules of law. Art. 31.3 (c) of 
78 The MERCOSUR is the Southern Common Market is an example of the same.
79 “Korea — Measures Affecting Government Procurement”, WT/DS163/R, adopted by the 
DSB on 19 June 2000, ¶7.96.
80 As mentioned above, principles of jus cogens will override WTO law in case of conflict, 
and the UN Charter also has priority. Panels and the AB are expected to comply with these 
rules and principles of law.
81 See AB in “United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products”, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, report of the AB circulated on 12 October 1998, adopted by the DSB on 6 
November 1998, ¶ 158. See also panel in “European Communities — Measures Affecting 
the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products”, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, and WT/
DS293/R, adopted by the DSB on 21 November 2006, in respect of the interpretative con-
text of relevant rules of international law as stipulated in Art. 31.3 (c) of the VCLT, ¶7.67.
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the VCLT provides that any relevant rule of international law applicable 
between the disputing parties shall be taken into account, and the AB has 
occasionally applied international law as relevant context for the interpre-
tation of WTO law. WTO literature suggests that panels and the AB may 
take a harmonious approach in case of overlaps between WTO law and 
other international law.82 This view finds support in the AB’s statement in 
EC and Certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft, that Art. 31.3 (c) 
of the VCLT reflects a “systemic integration” and that any relevant rule of 
international law between the disputing parties must be taken into account. 
The AB stated further that it must strike a balance between other rules of 
international law and WTO law.83 Extending this to the issue about Art. 
XX (d) of GATT 1994, it would imply that panels and the AB should, as far 
as possible, interpret Art. XX (d) in a manner which would conform with a 
state’s other international obligations.
However, as the AB demonstrated in EC - Hormones, principles of inter-
national law must have reached a certain level of generality, and not be sec-
tor-specific, before they will qualify as general principles of international law. 
In that case, the AB dismissed the claim that the precautionary principle was 
a general principle of international law. According to the AB, the principle 
had crystalized into a principle of international environmental law, but still 
awaited authoritative formulation under international law. Nevertheless, 
aspects of the precautionary principle were found in the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and could be applied to 
the extent to which they fell within the confinement of the SPS Agreement.84 
In EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the panel followed 
the same line of reasoning as the AB and stated that the legal status of the 
precautionary principle as a general principle of international law was still 
unsettled.85 The overarching problem is that, on one hand panels and the AB 
seem to be reluctant to apply other sources of international law as it might 
be construed as a violation of their mandate under Art. 3.2 of the DSU; but 
on the other hand, the catalogue of sources, which for example apply to 
the ICJ,86 are generally binding on the WTO Members. Disregarding these 
82 Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 357 (Oxford 
University Press 2009).
83 “European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft”, WT/
DS316/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 1 June 2011, ¶ 845.
84 “European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)”, 
WT/DS26/AB/R and WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 13 February 1998, ¶ 
123-124
85 “European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products”, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R and WT/DS293/R, report of the panel circulated 
on 29 September 2006, ¶ 7.76-7.89.
86 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, Art. 38.
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sources could jeopardise a WTO Member’s other obligations under public 
international law and create legal uncertainty as to which international obli-
gations a state should comply with.
International Law Forming Part of Domestic Law
The next aspect of Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks concerns the link between 
international law and domestic law. Mexico claimed that international law 
fell under “laws or regulations” of Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994. As mentioned 
above, Mexico argued that even if there was a violation of the national treat-
ment principle, it would be justified under Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 as the 
measures were necessary to ensure that the US complied with its obligations 
under NAFTA law.87 According to Mexico, “laws or regulations” included 
US’ obligations under NAFTA.
The panel rejected the use of Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994. The AB upheld 
the finding of the panel although with a different argumentation. Firstly, 
the AB noted that “laws or regulations” does not refer to another WTO 
Member’s obligations under international law. Thus Mexico cannot seek 
recourse to Art. XX (d) in order to ensure that the US complies with its 
international obligations. Secondly, the examples of laws and regulations 
illustrated in Art. XX (d) all refer to domestic systems. Lastly, from the 
context of Art. XX, there are express references to international obligations 
and agreements in some of the other paragraphs. For example, paragraph 
(h) refers to measures “undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any 
intergovernmental commodity agreement which conforms to criteria sub-
mitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by them or 
which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved” (emphasis provided), 
whereas paragraph (d) omits such references indicating that “international 
law” is not intended to be covered by “laws or regulations” of Art. XX (d) 
of GATT 1994.88
However, even though “laws or regulations” refers to domestic legislative 
or regulatory measures, it does not exclude the relevance of international 
law. According to the AB:
“Domestic legislative or regulatory acts sometimes may be intended 
to implement an international agreement. In such situations, the 
87 “Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages”, WT/DS308/R, panel 
report circulated on 7 October 2005, ¶ 4.118.
88 “Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages”, WT/DS308/AB/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 24 March 2006, ¶ 69-72.
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origin of the rule is international, but the implementing instrument is 
a domestic law or regulation”89
Without further elaboration on the implementing instruments, the AB 
concluded:
“[W]e conclude that the terms “laws or regulations” cover rules that 
form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO Member, including 
rules deriving from international agreements that have been incorpo-
rated into the domestic legal system of a WTO Member or have direct 
effect according to that WTO Member’s legal system.”90 ( emphasis 
provided)
Therefore, according to the AB violations of WTO law by a member can-
not be justified if the measures serve to seek compliance with international 
law. It is only compliance with domestic laws and regulations which is cov-
ered by Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994. Only in situations where international 
law either has been “incorporated” into domestic law or has “direct effect” 
will it be considered as forming part of domestic law.
“Direct effect” generally means that national courts give effect to rules or 
principles of international law without relying on an “incorporation” mech-
anism through legislative measures. The concept itself can vary in degree 
and function. Direct effect can be used in the construction of national law 
where international law serves as a basis for supporting or guiding national 
law’s protection of certain rights, or it can be used to give effect directly to 
international law without resorting to national law.91 The AB itself does not 
elaborate on the meaning of “direct effect”. Notably, it has been applied 
within the EU legal order, concerning the EU citizens right to invoke and 
rely on EU law before the national courts if the EU provisions are sufficiently 
clear, precise and unconditional.92 Direct effect has also been applied to give 
effect to international law in the EU legal order by the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ).93 However, the effect of international treaties in the EU order 
89 “Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages”, WT/DS308/AB/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 24 March 2006, ¶ 69.
90 “Mexico — Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages”, WT/DS308/AB/R, 
adopted by the DSB on 24 March 2006, ¶ 79.
91 André Nollkaemper, “The Duality of Direct Effect of International Law”, 25 (1) EJIL, 105, 
110 (2014).
92 Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admn., judgment of the 
Court of 5 February 1963, EU:C:1963:1.
93 Case 181/73, R.&V. Haegeman v. Belgian State, judgment of the EC Court on 30 April 
1974, EU:C:1974:41; Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG 
a.A., judgment of the EC Court on 26 October 1982, EU:C:1982:362, ¶ 18-27.
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depends on the character of the treaty.94 For example, the ECJ has developed 
a substantial practice concerning the effect of WTO law in the EU. Only if 
the EU institutions have intended to implement a WTO treaty, or if there is 
explicit reference to WTO provisions in EU legal instruments, will the ECJ 
review the legality of EU measures in light of WTO law.95
Direct effect may be able to close a gap in the multilevel rule of law by con-
necting international law with the domestic system, however it opens some 
others. Armin von Bogdandy suggests that direct effect implies increased 
pressure to harmonize national law with international law. Otherwise the 
state risks reverse discrimination as it allows the transnational market agent 
to rely on international rules which may not be applicable in sole intra-state 
issues, whereas the intra-state agents would have to rely on domestic law. 
Furthermore, there is risk of legal uncertainty for national agents as they 
would be unclear as to whether national law or international law would 
apply to foreign competitors, and finally legal equality would be endangered 
if there are no institutional structures on the international level to guarantee 
the same treatment of all individuals across all the national systems; a risk of 
non-uniform application of the international rules in the respective national 
systems.96
Moreover, if “direct effect” and “incorporation” are understood nar-
rowly, it will create some challenges in respect of legal expectations. The 
94 Case C-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union, judgment 
of the Court of 5 October 1994, EU:C:1994:367, ¶ 110.
95 Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council of the European Union, judgment of the 
Court of 23 November 1999, EU:C:1999:574, ¶ 47; Case C-93/02 P, Biret International 
SA v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of the Court (Full Court) of 30 September 
2003, EU:C:2003:517, ¶ 52; Case C-377/02, Léon Van Parys NV v. Belgisch Interventie- 
en Restitutiebureau, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 1 March 2005, 
EU:C:2005:121, ¶ 39; and joined cases C-120/06 P and C-121/06 P, Fabbrica italiana 
accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA v. Council of the European Union, judgment of 
the Court (Grand Chamber) of 9 September 2008, EU:C:2008:476, ¶ 111. The ECJ based 
its argument on the reciprocal nature of the WTO, and the fact that some other WTO 
Members do not allow a direct effect of WTO law in their national system, see Portuguese 
Republic v. Council of the European Union, judgment of the Court of 23 November 1999, 
EU:C:1999:574, ¶ 42-44. Furthermore, the ECJ has also rejected direct effect of AB deci-
sions even if the decision is directed towards the EU. The reasons for the rejections are 
based on same arguments as above concerning the effect of WTO treaties, and the fact 
that panel and AB decisions cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations of WTO 
members and thus cannot impose any rights for individuals before the ECJ, see C-120/06 
P and C-121/06 P, Fabbrica italiana accumulatori motocarri Montecchio SpA v. Council 
of the European Union, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 9 September 2008, 
EU:C:2008:476, ¶ 131.
96 Armin von Bogdandy, “Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the Relationship 
between International and Domestic Constitutional Law”, 6 Intl. J. Const. L., 397, 404-
407 (2008).
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two approaches might not exhaustively cover all the ways in which a state 
incorporates international law into its domestic sphere. International law 
might enter the domestic sphere by other means which depends on both the 
legal culture and the political system. For instance, there can be administra-
tive practices where international law is applied without being incorporated 
through a law-making exercise or without a court giving direct effect to 
international law. An example of this is how the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) was incorporated into Danish law by the Danish 
Parliament in 1992.97 Before the incorporation, the High Court of Eastern 
Denmark had found that the ECHR had “direct effect” before the courts 
because principles of the ECHR had been effectively applied in the pub-
lic system.98 The Danish Ombudsman, who is authorised to make critique 
of the public administration and to provide recommendations to the public 
institutions about reopening cases against citizens, had an established prac-
tice of applying the ECHR as a legal basis of his critique of the administra-
tive practices of public institutions, a long time before the High Court of 
Eastern Denmark established its “direct effect”.99 The Danish Ombudsman 
does not make binding decisions but it is a constitutional convention that 
public authorities comply with its recommendations. Notwithstanding the 
non-binding nature of the recommendations and the fact that the Danish 
Ombudsman does not have the mandate to incorporate international law, 
nor to give international obligations a direct effect as a binding legal instru-
ment, the recommendations are considered with high legal value in Danish 
public law.100
Where administrative decisions or practices create legal expectations 
among citizens of a society, it can be debated whether the connection between 
international law and an administrative practice, in particular non-binding 
measures, can be considered as “incorporated” or “direct effect” if these 
concepts are defined narrowly. The result is that a rule of law at the national 
level will not match a rule of law at the WTO level.
97 See more at Institut for Menneskerettigheder (the Danish Institute for Human Rights); 
https://menneskeret.dk/om-os/menneskerettigheder/menneskerettigheder-eu/euro-
paeiske-menneskerettighedskonvention, retrieved on 14 October 2017.
98 See Pia Justesen, Menneskerettighedernes status i dansk ret (The status of Human Rights 
in Danish Law), in Grundloven og menneskerettigheder – i et dansk og europæisk per-
spektiv (The Constitution and Human Rights – A Danish and European Perspective), 
105, 113 [Morten Kjærum, Klaus Slavensky, and Jens Vedsted-Hansen (eds.), Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag 1997].
99 See for example two cases from 1983 and 1988 where the Danish Ombudsman referred 
to Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights about the right to family life as 
partly basis for his recommendations; FOB nr. 83.205; and FOB nr. 88.93.
100 See for example Jon Andersen, Forvaltningsret, Administrative Law, 26, 169-202 [5th edn., 
Forlaget Thomson/GadJura (eds.), 2003].
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inDia – solaR cells: nuances anD continueD 
unceRtainty
Where Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks revealed some uncertainty in 
respect of connecting international and national law as well as the applica-
tion of customary rules and principles of public international law within the 
WTO regime, India – Solar Cells seems to vaguely clarify and nuance the 
scope of the connection mechanisms, but does not overcome the uncertainty 
about the relationship between WTO law and international law.
Overview
India had domestic content requirements (DCR) for producers of electricity 
which restricted the use of foreign solar cells. According to India, the DCRs 
were necessary in order to establish a locally based production which could 
ensure a sustained supply in case of disruption of imported components. 
India argued that if not for the DCR, it would not be able to comply with its 
obligations under domestic law and international law to ensure ecologically 
sustainable growth, and with its obligations related to climate change.101 
The US argued that the DCRs were inconsistent with Art. III of GATT 
1994 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). 
India defended the use of the DCRs with reference to Art. XX (d) of GATT 
1994; the DCRs had been designed to ensure compliance with both domes-
tic and international law concerning obligations of ecologically sustainable 
growth and climate change, and there were no reasonable alternatives avail-
able. To support its arguments, India referred to national measures like the 
Electricity Act read with the National Electricity Policy, and the National 
Climate Change Action Plan and to its international obligations under inter-
national law102 like the WTO Agreement, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (1992), and the Rio+20 Document: ‘The Future We Want’, 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2012. The US, on the 
other hand, argued that Art. XX (d) was not applicable as several of the 
international instruments India referred to had more characters of policy 
documents than law, that India had failed to demonstrate that the DCRs 
were necessary to comply with their national obligations, and that the 
101 See India’s arguments in “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules”, WT/DS456/R/Add.1, Annex B-3, ¶ 53.
102 See India’s Arguments, “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules”, WT/DS456/R/Add.1, Annex B-4, ¶ 31-44.
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international instruments, which India referred to, had not been sufficiently 
incorporated into domestic law.103
The panel examined the international and national instruments in order 
to establish whether they were “laws or regulations” within the meaning 
of Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994, and referred to the AB’s finding in Mexico 
– Taxes on Soft Drinks to determine whether the international rules had 
been incorporated or had direct effect. In analysing “laws or regulations” 
the panel took a narrow approach. “Laws or regulations” was limited to 
“legally enforceable rules of conduct under the domestic legal system.”104 
However, the AB disagreed with the narrow approach adopted by the panel 
and concluded:
“a panel should evaluate and give due consideration to all the char-
acteristics of the relevant instrument(s) and should avoid focusing 
exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic. In particular, it 
may be relevant for a panel to consider, among others:
 i. the degree of normativity of the instrument and the extent to which 
the instrument operates to set out a rule of conduct or course of 
action that is to be observed within the domestic legal system of a 
Member;
 ii. the degree of specificity of the relevant rule;
 iii. whether the rule is legally enforceable, including, e.g. before a court 
of law;
 iv. whether the rule has been adopted or recognized by a competent 
authority possessing the necessary powers under the domestic legal 
system of a Member;
 v. the form and title given to any instrument or instruments containing 
the rule under the domestic legal system of a Member; and
 vi. the penalties or sanctions that may accompany the relevant rule.”105
However, the AB also noted that some cases might not be straightforward 
and that the assessment must be made on a case-by-case basis, “in light of 
103 See US Arguments, “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, 
WT/DS456/R/Add.1, Annex B-1, ¶ 58-61.
104 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/R, 
panel report circulated on 24 February 2016, ¶ 7.311.
105 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.113.
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the specific characteristics and features of the instruments at issue, the rule 
alleged to exist, and the domestic legal system of the Member concerned.”106
India argued that both binding and non-binding national instruments 
qualify as “laws or regulations” as, ““legal framework in India” comprises 
both “binding” laws, and policies and plans, that provide the “framework 
for executive action””.107 The panel had analysed the Indian domestic 
instruments but found that India had not lifted the burden of demonstrating 
that the domestic instruments were altogether a rule to ensure ecologically 
sustainable growth. The AB, in spite of its critique of the panel’s narrow 
approach to “laws or regulations”, upheld the conclusion of the panel. The 
relevant domestic instruments were held to be “hortatory, aspirational, 
declaratory, and at times solely descriptive.”108
The factors to determine whether a rule can fall under “laws or regula-
tions” also apply to a rule of international law if it meets the connection 
requirements. However, the AB nuanced its view from Mexico – Taxes on 
Soft Drinks. It first repeated the “incorporation” or “direct effect” require-
ment and then stated:
“Subject to the domestic legal system of a Member, there may well be 
other ways in which international instruments or rules can become 
part of that domestic legal system. An assessment of whether a given 
international instrument or rule forms part of the domestic legal sys-
tem of a Member must be carried out on a case-by-case basis, in light 
of the nature of the instrument or rule and the subject matter of the 
law at issue, and taking into account the functioning of the domestic 
legal system of the Member in question.”109
However, India’s argument in this respect was rejected by both panel and 
AB. India’s reference to a Supreme Court ruling did not demonstrate that 
there existed direct effect of international rules in the Indian legal system. 
According to the AB, the Indian Supreme Court had emphasized the rel-
evance of the international instruments but it could not be inferred from 
that statement that the international instruments formed part of Indian law. 
106 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.114.
107 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.117.
108 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.133.
109 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.140.
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Rather, the direct effect of the rule was established only if the executive 
branch takes actions in pursuance of international law.110
Overcoming some Rule of Law Challenges; Incorporation, 
Direct Effect, and the Nature of an International Instrument
There must be an individual assessment of whether the international instru-
ment forms part of domestic law. In India – Solar Cells, the AB took a 
broader approach compared to Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks as it recog-
nized that the WTO Members may have other means to form international 
law as part of its domestic system than “incorporation” and “direct effect”. 
In that respect it seems to overcome some of the rule of law problems which 
were identified above, as arising in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks. It must 
be assumed that administrative practices in national systems can provide the 
connection mechanism. In India – Solar Cells, the AB also stated that “the 
very fact that the executive branch can take action to “execute” the inter-
national instruments or rules at issue, (…) because they are not in conflict 
with domestic legislation shows that these international instruments may 
already form part of its domestic legal system.”111 However, it is not enough 
if the international instrument only serves as a context for the interpretation 
of national law, or if they are used merely as a guidance for exercising deci-
sions by governmental bodies.112 It seems that the test of whether an inter-
national instrument forms part of domestic law is based on three elements;
 1) the nature of the international instrument,
 2) the subject matter of the law at issue, and
 3) the functioning of the domestic legal system.
By including the nature of the international instrument in the connec-
tion test, the AB seems to accept that international legal instruments can 
have different legal weight. They can range from overall policy frameworks, 
which nevertheless might have a de facto binding force, to hard law instru-
ments and various other instruments of different legal nature in between. 
The question is whether some international instruments have such special 
character and strength in the international order that it would be difficult 
to reject a state’s reference to it as forming part of its domestic system. For 
110 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.148.
111 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.145
112 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.148.
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example, a state might not have incorporated the UN Charter, nor have a 
basis for direct effect if it has not been subject to practice by the courts, 
but may nevertheless resort to “laws or regulations” as a basis for applying 
measures to secure the state’s compliance with the UN Charter. It is similar 
with erga omnes obligations which a state must comply with regardless of 
its incorporation or direct effect. But that argument does not seem to be 
persuasive. Just because a rule of international law might pass the connec-
tion criteria, does not mean that it will pass the “laws or regulations” test, 
nor does it mean that international rules and principles of law with a higher 
ranking status will automatically qualify as “laws or regulations”. This is 
discussed in the next section.
The “Laws or Regulation” Test and New Challenges
In India – Solar Cells, the panel and AB took different approaches to “laws 
or regulations”. Where the panel relied on the enforceability of a rule as 
qualifying criterion for “laws or regulation”, the AB took a broader approach 
with its non-exhaustive list of factors which should be included in the analy-
sis. The list of factors, which should be taken into consideration; i.e. degree 
of normativity, degree of specificity, enforceability, recognized by compe-
tent authority, form and title, and sanctions, has the advantage of including 
specific norms or practices from a society, which in that society may have 
character of law, even if it does not have a clear formal basis or only has lim-
ited enforceability. Thus, it allows for various cultural dimensions to “law”. 
It is interesting to note that a panel in US – Section 301 Trade Act took a 
broader approach to “domestic law” than the panel in India – Solar Cells. 
Even though the case cannot be directly comparable to India – Solar Cells as 
it does not concern Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994, it still demonstrates different 
methodological bases between panels. In US — Section 301 Trade Act, the 
panel had to establish US law as a fact to determine whether the law violated 
various provisions of GATT 1994. In establishing domestic law, the panel 
stated:
“[A]ccount must be taken of the wide-ranging diversity in the legal 
systems of the Members. Conformity [with WTO law] can be 
ensured in different ways in different legal systems. It is the end result 
that counts, not the manner in which it is achieved. Only by under-
standing and respecting the specificities of each Member’s legal sys-
tem, can a correct evaluation of conformity be established”.113 (…) 
113 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 7.24.
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In evaluating the conformity of Sections 301-310 with the relevant 
WTO provisions we must, thus, be cognizant of this multi-layered 
character of the national law under consideration which includes 
statutory language as well as other institutional and administrative 
elements.”114
Thus, in contrast to the panel’s approach in India – Solar Cells, it is not 
only a matter of enforceability, but more of a holistic exercise taking into 
account various elements of the legal and administrative system. It is an 
approach with wider scope for differences in the respective WTO Members’ 
constitutional, legal and administrative systems. As mentioned before, with 
the example of the Danish Ombudsman, his recommendations would prob-
ably not qualify as “laws or regulations” based on an approach on enforce-
ability, as the recommendations are not binding. However, Danish public 
authorities are still expected to comply with the recommendations. By tak-
ing a broad approach to “laws or regulations” under Art. XX (d) of GATT 
1994, the AB seems to acknowledge the differences there can be between 
various types of “laws or regulations” in the WTO Members’ constitutional, 
political, and legal systems and cultures.
The broader approach opens up for debate the question whether interna-
tional norms, which have character of soft law, can pass the “laws or regula-
tions” test which will be discussed below.115 The international instruments, 
which form part of the domestic system, must go through the same “laws or 
regulations” test as domestic instruments. As the AB stated in India – Solar 
Cells:
“We emphasize that, even if a particular international instrument 
can be said to form part of the domestic legal system of a Member, 
this does not, in and of itself, establish the existence of a rule, obliga-
tion, or requirement within the domestic legal system of the Member 
that falls within the scope of a “law or regulation” under Article 
XX(d).”116
According to the criteria from India – Solar Cells, it is a matter of their 
normative force, degree of specificity etc. whether the international instru-
ment will qualify under “laws or regulations”. In a footnote, the AB added:
114 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 7.26.
115 International law can be made of “hard law” or “soft law” where the distinguishing factor 
is the binding character of the norm.
116 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, ¶ 5.141.
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“In the context of India’s argument that the “DCR measures … have 
been designed to secure compliance with India’s obligations under 
international law” (India’s appellant’s submission, para. 169), we 
note that the degree of normativity of an international instrument or 
rule under the domestic legal system of a Member may be different 
from the degree of normativity of such an instrument or rule under 
public international law. Thus, for example, while the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda under public international law, as codified in 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (done at 
Vienna, 23 May 1969, UN Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331), requires 
that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must 
be performed by them in good faith”, this does not mean that, in and 
of itself, there is a rule, requirement, or obligation within the domes-
tic legal system of a Member that falls within the scope of “laws or 
regulations”.”117
It might imply that a hard law instrument will not pass the test if in the 
national system it does not carry a sufficient degree of normative force. For 
example, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and 
the Protocols Thereto provides a number of obligations on states to combat 
transnational crimes – in respect of their constitutional traditions – and to 
introduce specific institutional and legal instruments for the purpose. Even 
if a state has implemented it into its domestic system, but the operation 
of it in the specific domestic system is weak, it might not qualify under 
“laws or regulations” regardless of its hard law character in international 
law. However, international soft law instruments might qualify as “laws 
or regulations” if they are provided with sufficient normative force in the 
domestic systems. For example, international financial law and regulations 
have numerous soft law instruments in areas which are regulated by the 
financial sector to a large extent. If a state attempts to introduce measures, 
which are facilitating export and limiting import of goods and services, in 
order to attract foreign investment and capital to national production and to 
improve the liquidity of financial institutions, it could be a violation of the 
trade rules. Capital requirements and supervision of financial institutions is 
regulated internationally in the Basel Accords. They aim at strengthening 
the regulation, supervision, and risk management of the banking sector, for 
example by imposing specific levels of capital requirements on banks, but 
they are not binding on states. They are issued by the Basel Committee of 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) whose mandate is “the primary global stand-
ard setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for 
117 “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, WT/DS456/
AB/R, adopted by the DSB on 16 September 2016, footnote 386.
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cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to strengthen 
the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the 
purpose of enhancing financial stability.”118 However it “does not possess 
any formal supranational authority. Its decisions do not have legal force. 
Rather, the BCBS relies on its members’ commitments, (…), to achieve its 
mandate.”119 The Members, which are mostly central banks with author-
ity to supervise and regulate the national banking and financial sector, are 
expected to implement the standards of the BCBS. The implementation of 
the Basel Accords is monitored and will be published by the BCBS, and the 
Members are accountable to the BCBS and must publish follow-up actions. 
In the latest progress report there seem to be a high level of compliance 
with the implementation of the Basel III standards, although there are still 
areas which are in the process of implementation.120 Therefore, it can here be 
argued that even though the Basel Accords do not have a binding character, 
they do get binding effect through implementation by national regulators, 
and thus the tools for connecting international law to the domestic systems 
seem to change the character of the Basel Accord, at least in the national reg-
ulatory systems. It then becomes a question of how much normative strength 
they will have in the national system. For example, the EU in its prudential 
requirements and supervision regulations and directives has implemented 
118 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Charter, 2013, S. 1.
119 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Charter, 2013, S. 3; Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) Charter, 2013, S. 5 concerns the responsibilities of the 
Members; “BCBS members are committed to: (a) work together to achieve the mandate of 
the BCBS; (b) promote financial stability; (c) continuously enhance their quality of bank-
ing regulation and supervision; (d) actively contribute to the development of BCBS stand-
ards, guidelines and sound practices; (e) implement and apply BCBS standards in their 
domestic jurisdictions within the pre-defined time frame established by the Committee; 
(f) undergo and participate in BCBS reviews to assess the consistency and effectiveness of 
domestic rules and supervisory practices in relation to BCBS standards; and (g) promote 
the interests of global financial stability and not solely national interests, while participat-
ing in BCBS work and decision-making.”
120 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Twelfth Progress Report on Adoption of the 
Basel Regulatory Framework, April 2017. See also general overview of Members’ perfor-
mance, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/implementation/rcap_jurisdictional.htm, retrieved on 
14 October 2017.
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Basel III.121 EU regulations and directives are binding EU law and they have 
strong normative force in the EU Member States.122
Here, the AB steps into a more realist approach where it is necessary to 
determine whether the international instrument, which seeks to pass the 
connection test, in reality has a normative value in the domestic system. A 
state should not be able to invoke the exception in Art. XX (d) of GATT 
1994 based on compliance with international law which has merely been 
incorporated into the national system, without the said international rule 
having a sufficient degree of normativity in the domestic system. The AB 
takes a role of assessing some of the rule of law elements at domestic levels, 
concerning the actual access to justice with its basis in a rule of international 
law. The irony is that an international soft law instrument might qualify 
under “laws or regulations,” if it has achieved normative force through its 
implementation into the domestic order, while an international hard law 
instrument might not.
Jurisdictional Issues and Cross-Sectorial Overlaps
Where the AB seems to overcome some operational rule of law challenges 
between international and national level, it still leaves open some questions 
about the scope of international law in the WTO system and the potential 
overlap between WTO law and other rules of international law. It is clear 
from Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, and confirmed in India – Solar Cells, 
that sources of international law can be applied as “laws or regulations” 
if they meet the connection criteria and they qualify under “laws or reg-
ulation”. But if an international rule complied with by the state overlaps 
with WTO law, it might also be in conflict with WTO law. In the situation 
in India – Solar Cells if the international environmental treaties had been 
better connected into the Indian domestic legal system, they could poten-
tially be at odds with WTO law. The aim of this paper is not to engage in 
a discussion about the relationship between WTO law and international 
environmental law, and the extent of overlaps between them, but only to 
121 See Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 Text with EEA relevance, generally in the pre-
amble; and Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC Text with EEA relevance, Recitals 79-80.
The European Commission, the European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European 
Central Bank are observers, not members, of the BCBS.
122 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union Art. 288, 
2008 O.J. C 115/47.
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illustrate the multilevel rule of law challenge in respect of the application of 
Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994.123
India stated in its submission to the panel:
“India’s DCR Measure has been designed to secure compliance 
with the afore-mentioned laws and regulations [including the WTO 
Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(1992), and the Rio+20 Document: ‘The Future We Want’, adopted 
by the United Nations General Assembly in 2012] which are them-
selves not GATT inconsistent.”124
The conformity between WTO law and the international instruments, 
which India referred to, was not questioned by the US or the third par-
ties, and thus India’s statement of “not GATT inconsistent” international 
instruments was not tested by the panel and the AB. However, the question 
remains: can a panel or AB decide whether an international obligation can 
be inconsistent with WTO law?
Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 requires that the measures must be “necessary 
to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement”. (emphasis provided). As mentioned 
above with reference to Japan – Agricultural Products,125 and Thailand – 
Cigarettes (Philippines),126 if domestic laws or regulations are inconsistent 
with WTO law, Art. XX (d) will not apply. Here, it can be argued that if 
the “international rule” is not consistent with WTO law, it cannot meet 
the conditions of Art. XX (d). However, such position cannot be justified 
easily; a state must comply with all its international obligations.127 Generally 
123 It should be noted that protection of the environment is one of the aims of the WTO as 
provided in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, it is a legitimate exemption in var-
ious provisions, like Arts. XX (b) and (g) of GATT 1994, and it has been a legitimate 
reason for subsidizing industries which otherwise would harm the environment in argu-
ment based on negative externalities by the AB in its interpretation of “market” in the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement in “Canada — Certain Measures 
Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector”, WT/DS412/AB/R and “Canada — 
Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program”, WT/DS426/AB/R, adopted by the DSB 
on 24 May 2013, ¶ 5.179-5.189; and Henrik Andersen, Protection of Non-Trade Values 
in WTO Appellate Body Jurisprudence: Exceptions, Economic Arguments, and Eluding 
Questions, 18 J. Int’l Econ. L. 383, 397 (2015).
124 India’s Arguments “India — Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules”, 
WT/DS456/R/Add.1, Annex B-4, ¶ 37.
125 GATT Panel Report, “Japan – Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products”, 
L/6253, adopted on 2 March 1988, BISD 35S/163.
126 “Thailand — Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines”, WT/
DS371/R, adopted by the DSB on 15 July 2011.
127 Cf. for example the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
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there no hierarchy within international law instruments, and further there 
is no hierarchy between WTO law and other international treaties, where 
the former is placed above the latter. However, there are a few exceptions 
like principles of jus cogens having priority over WTO law,128 and in cases 
of conflict between the UN Charter and the WTO treaties, the UN Charter 
will prevailing.129
There is not a lot of guidance in AB jurisprudence concerning the rela-
tionship between WTO law and international law in general. As mentioned 
above, the AB has generally been reluctant to include sources of international 
law other than WTO law, but has been more open to applying international 
law as context for the interpretation of WTO treaties, and in general seems to 
take a harmonious approach to interpretation in order to avoid conflict with 
other international law. In addition, as mentioned above in Mexico – Taxes 
on Soft Drinks, the AB made a clear jurisdictional delimitation concerning 
disputes falling within the realm of other international organizations.
Even though there is not a lot of guidance in WTO jurisprudence concern-
ing the interface between WTO law and law of other organizations, Brazil 
– Retreaded Tyres took the panel and the AB into an area with a poten-
tial institutional and legal conflict between WTO law and MERCOSUR 
law. Brazil had imposed a ban on the import of retreaded tyres. Brazil, as 
a member of the MERCOSUR, was challenged by another MERCOSUR 
Member, Uruguay, before the MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal for violat-
ing MERCOSUR law. According to Uruguay, Brazil violated MERCOSUR 
decision 22/2000 which provides that MERCOSUR Members must not 
introduce trade restrictions amongst themselves. The MERCOSUR Arbitral 
Tribunal ruled in favour of Uruguay, and Brazil complied with the ruling 
and amended its law accordingly. Brazil then allowed import of retreaded 
tyres from other MERCOSUR Members but kept the ban on all other coun-
tries. After Brazil’s amendments of its laws, the EU filed a complaint in 
the WTO dispute settlement system against Brazil. The EU claimed that 
Brazil imposed quantitative restrictions on retreaded tyres and discrimi-
nated between MERCOSUR Members and non-MERCOSUR Members in 
violation of WTO law. As mentioned above, the panel rejected that Art. 
XX (d) of GATT 1994 was applicable as the import ban was inconsistent 
with GATT 1994. Besides referring to Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994, Brazil 
defended its measures by claiming that they were necessary in order to 
128 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Art. 
53; See also representative of Switzerland, Summary Report on the Thirteenth Meeting of 
the Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, 15-16 September 2005, TN/
TE/R/13, 11 October 2005, ¶ 6;
129 UN Charter, Art. 103, together with Art. XVI.6 of the WTO Agreement.
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protect human health under Art. XX (b) of GATT 1994. The import of 
retreaded tyres increased the risk of malaria caused by mosquitoes which 
used tyres as breeding grounds. The panel supported the Brazilian view that 
the measures were necessary to protect human health under Art. XX (b) of 
GATT 1994, which was upheld by the AB in its report. The panel further 
found that the measures did not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable dis-
crimination under the chapeau of Art. XX of GATT 1994, as the ruling 
by the MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal provided legitimate basis for such 
discrimination. However, on this issue, the AB disagreed with the panel.130 
According to the AB, the ruling by the MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal was 
not a justifiable explanation under the chapeau of Art. XX of GATT 1994 
for discrimination between MERCOSUR Members and WTO Members as 
the ruling by the MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal had no connection with 
the policy objective of human health of Art. XX (b) of GATT 1994.131
The question is whether the AB with its decision takes priority over 
other international trade courts and whether it ranks WTO law higher than 
MERCOSUR law.132 The AB stated that it did not see a conflict between 
WTO law and MERCOSUR law, nor a conflict between its own decision 
and the ruling by the MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal, as Brazil had not 
used the human health argument before the MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal. 
According to the AB, Brazil could have resorted to Art. 50 (d) of the Treaty 
of Montevideo which provides similar exceptions as Art. XX (b) of GATT 
1994, but decided not to.133 Thus, the case before the MERCOSUR Arbitral 
Tribunal cannot be directly compared to the one before the AB. However, 
the question remains that if Brazil had applied the exemption of Art. 50 (d) 
of the Treaty of Montevideo and the MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal had 
130 “Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres”, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted by 
the DSB on 17 December 2007, ¶ 253-256. The AB did not make an analysis of the exemp-
tion in Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 as it had found that the import ban was inconsistent 
with the chapeau of Art. XX and thus could not be exempted under Art. XX (d).
131 “Brazil — Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres”, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted by 
the DSB on 17 December 2007, ¶ 229.
132 The case caused some debate in literature; see N. Lavranos, Jurisdictional Competition: 
Selected Cases in International and European Law, 46 (Europa Law Publishing, 2010); 
and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Administration of Justice in the World Trade Organization: 
Did the AB Commit ‘Grave Injustice’?”, 8 (3) Law & Prac Int’l Courts & Trib, 329 (2009).
133 Under the Treaty of Asunción – and later the Protocol of Ouro Preto, the MERCOSUR 
Members must comply with their obligations under the Latin American Integration 
Association, cf. Art. 8 of the Treaty of Asunción, which has its basis in the Treaty of 
Montevideo (1980). It provides in Art. 50 (d): “Ninguna disposición del presente Tratado 
será interpretada como impedimento para la adopción y el cumplimiento de medidas 
destinadas a la: (…) (d) Protección de la vida y salud de las personas, los animales y los 
vegetales.” (No provision under the present Treaty shall be interpreted as precluding the 
adoption and observance of measures regarding: (…) (d) Protection of human, animal and 
plant life and health).
2019 IndIa – solar cells and mexIco – Taxes on sofT drInks 101
rejected it, would the AB then have accepted the ruling regardless of its 
outcome? The wording of the AB report seems to indicate that it is not a 
rejection of acceptance of rulings by other international courts and tribunals 
but merely a rejection of application of the ruling in the specific case because 
it bears no relationship with Art. XX (b) of GATT 1994, i.e. the ruling by 
the MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal does not concern human health which 
Art. XX (b) of GATT 1994 protects. The statement from the AB about the 
non-conflict between its decision and MERCOSUR law should be consid-
ered as an obiter dictum which the AB found necessary to include in order 
to eliminate the thought that it posits its own rulings over those of other 
international courts.
How the panel and AB will approach an overlap between WTO law and 
other international law, and case law from other international courts, in 
cases concerning Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994, still needs to be clarified. At 
this stage, there are only hints taken from cases concerning other provisions, 
where the impression is that the AB explicitly avoids conflict between WTO 
law and other international law, and that so far it has not put WTO law 
and its own mandate higher than other international law and international 
courts. It must be expected that panels and the AB in situations where a 
WTO Member resorts to Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 to comply with its 
international obligations, which are connected to the domestic system with 
a sufficient degree of normative force etc., will as far as possible interpret 
such international obligations in harmony with WTO law. Furthermore, it 
must be expected that the panels and AB will take into account decisions by 
international courts and tribunals, which have the mandate to interpret the 
specific international treaties from which the relevant international obliga-
tions are derived, ,in order to avert a situation where a state cannot comply 
with decisions from other international courts as it would violate WTO law. 
This would ensure harmony between international courts and would ensure 
that the rule of law can be upheld in the respective international orders. It 
would also help developing some overall principles of law at the interna-
tional level which can serve as guidance in potential norm or jurisdictional 
overlaps in the future.
conclusion
The article has addressed multilevel rule of law challenges when Art. XX (d) 
of GATT 1994 is applied. Finding a balance between WTO law and meas-
ures protecting national law is a task for panels and the AB where the WTO 
Members often fail in demonstrating that they meet the criteria of Art. XX 
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(d). The problem is that market agents might find it difficult to see through 
national measures compliance with WTO law but a consistent approach by 
panels and the AB in the interpretation of Art. XX (d) might give predicta-
bility into the multilevel challenge and support a rule of law.
The special focus of this article has been on the role of other interna-
tional law in WTO law. Multilevel rule of law must have some additional 
dimensions, as compared to a traditional, nationally anchored, rule of law. 
It includes the connection between international law and national law, and 
it includes norm and jurisdictional overlaps between WTO law and inter-
national law. Through Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks and India – Solar 
Cells, the AB has clarified the position about connecting international law 
with national law. The connecting tools used should not be limited to incor-
poration or direct effect. It should further depend on the domestic systems, 
including the constitutional, legal and administrative systems. It should be 
decided on a case-by-case basis with focus on the nature of the interna-
tional instrument, the subject matter of the law issue, and the functioning 
of the domestic system. Here it can here be argued that had the AB taken a 
narrow approach, like the panel in India – Solar Cells, it would have been 
clearer which criteria could be applied. However, the problem with the nar-
row approach – and the multilevel issue – is that it would rule out the specific 
legal traditions in a domestic system, which use means other than incorpora-
tion and direct effect to connect international law into the domestic system. 
That would violate the specific rule of law expectations within that state as 
their traditional connecting mechanism would be overruled by WTO law. 
The broader approach seems to accommodate such differences between 
the WTO Members and thus allow them to protect the expectations which 
international law has for citizens, companies etc. if it has become part of 
domestic law through their specific connecting mechanism.
It is also clear that panels and the AB cannot step beyond the jurisdic-
tional scope of WTO law and interfere into the jurisdiction of other interna-
tional courts. However, there can be situations with overlaps, where a state 
introduces measures to comply with its international obligations – assum-
ing that they form part of national law – which must be exempted through 
Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994, but where the international obligations overlap, 
and potentially conflict, with WTO law. That leads to two questions, 1) 
about the jurisdictional scope of WTO panels and the AB; and 2) about 
norm overlaps between WTO law and other international law. This is still 
unsettled in practice. However, in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the AB made it 
clear that it did not see a conflict between its own decision and that of the 
MERCOSUR Arbitral Tribunal, nor between MERCOSUR law and WTO 
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law, when it rejected the application of a decision from the MERCOSUR 
Arbitral Tribunal as a legitimate basis for applying Art. XX (b) of GATT 
1994 concerning protection of human health. This indicates that the AB 
will justify its own decision when it potentially overlaps with other juris-
dictions and establish a legal argument which suggests that there are no 
jurisdictional conflicts. In respect of norm overlaps, both panels and the 
AB accepts that international environmental law can be justified by a state 
as “laws or regulations” under Art. XX (d) of GATT 1994 if all criteria are 
met. Nevertheless, it is not clear how they will handle the situation if the 
other international treaties are potentially in conflict with WTO law. It is 
generally assumed under public international law that states must comply 
with all their international obligations. WTO case law indicates that a har-
monious approach is taken in order to avoid such conflict. Such a position 
will eliminate one rule of law challenge, as states and their citizens can rely 
on all their international rights and obligations, but it will create another, 
WTO law must be open for some variations in the interpretations of the 
WTO law in relation to states’ other obligations under international law. 
Thus, WTO law cannot be interpreted too rigidly in such situations. The pri-
mary objective is that panels and the AB should take a consistent approach 
in their methodology and allow for such balance between the WTO law and 
other international law as a conflict between WTO law and other interna-
tional law could create much bigger rule of law challenges. However, these 
multilevel rule of law challenges need further clarification in case law before 
a clearer picture of the jurisdictional and norm overlaps between the WTO 
and other international law can be established. Some overall constitutional 
meta-principles are available to settle certain norm conflicts but it still needs 
further expression in practice.
